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1. Introduction
Modern industrial development processes of new technologies are characterized by an in-
creasing complexity and interdependence of the different actors combining different
knowledge assets. Today, hardly any innovation can be assigned to one specific technological
field. Also, the sciences are becoming increasingly differentiated and specialized, thus
enhancing the necessity of horizontal and vertical knowledge transfer between the actors of
innovation processes. In this context, where single actors and even single firms are unable to
keep pace with technological progress, the idea of collective invention becomes obvious.
Concerning this, two points emphasized by modern innovation theory are of importance: First,
the overwhelming significance of cross-fertilization-effects are recognized (e.g. Mokyr, 1990).
In a technological development inevitably confronted with bottlenecks, new developmental
potentials can be created (- in the first place -) by the amalgamation of different technologies.
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Second, these technological interdependencies are mediated mainly by technological spill-
overs, which are no longer a natural feature of technological know-how. The knowledge-
based approach of modern innovation theory makes firm specificities as well as a technology
specifities responsible for an only curtailed unavoidable emergence of spillovers. However,
these positive externalities are a widely-spread phenomenon and claim for an economic
explanation.
Informal networks, i.e. loose relationships between firms, as well as between scientists and
engineers are identified as an industrial organizational device, in which new technological
knowledge is freely shared and distributed, and which can be considered as an important
source of spillover effects (Freeman, 1991). However, within the neoclassical approach, if re-
cognized at all, this behaviour apparently is at odds with myopic self-interest and can only be
explained in highly artificial and ad hoc ways (Silverberg, 1988). Therefore, in modern inno-
vation theory other approaches are invoked, allowing to model informal networks to develop
as collective phenomena. In particular, the theory of self-organization seems to be appropriate
in order to allow for only procedural rational agents, which in a cumulative and path-depen-
dent process constitute cooperative or non-cooperative environments (Pyka, 1997). In this
modeling framework the institutions of informal networks can self-organize as mergent
properties in dependence of the technological intensity of firms’ surroundings as well as on
critical fluctuations which in a way represent the feature of intrinsic uncertainty of innovation
processes.
In this paper the basic modeling framework of the evolution of informal networks is combined
with some stylized facts of the time patterns of the industrial evolution sketched by the theory
of industry life cycles. Integrating time-independent transition rates excludes the possibility of
analytical solutions, so numerical simulation experiments have to be performed. The results of
these experiments show structural developments at least qualitatively according to the
predictions of  life cycle theory. Most unexpectedly - from a traditional point of view - large
informal networks as a potential source of technological spillovers can sometimes be observed
in a state of the industry life cycle where R&D endeavours of firms are assumed to be already
concentrated on exploiting scale economies and process technologies instead of exploring new
technological opportunities.
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The paper is organized as follows: In the second part the theoretical framework of informal
networks in an industry life cycle context is discussed. Part 3 deals with the formal structure
of the self-organization approach to model informal networks and some first analytical results.
In part 4 we simulate the respective system in order to integrate time patterns of the
willingness to cooperate. The final part 5 finishes the discussion with some conclusions.
2. Informal Networks in an Industrial Life Cycle Context
Modern technical solutions are increasingly characterized by an interrelatedness between
heterogeneous actors and knowledge fields. According to Joly and Mangematin (1995) two
reasons are mainly responsible for this growing complexity of innovation processes: On the
one hand the sheer number of different material inputs required for innovation and production
has increased immensely. On the other hand, also the number of knowledge fields and skills
necessary for innovation and production is growing steadily. No single firm can keep pace
with the development of all relevant technologies. Therefore, firms must have access to
external knowledge sources. This is even more important at early phases of the technological
development, where technological uncertainty as well as financial constraints of new start-up
companies face innovative actors with severe difficulties and contingencies. Informal
networks or cooperative environments are an important organizational device for external
learning, helping firms to cope with this growing complexity.
- Technological uncertainty
The search for new technologies is a risky and uncertain endeavour. This uncertainty -
intrinsic to the innovation process - does not allow either to predict the timing, nor the
technological features nor the economic consequences of innovations: on the one hand, firms
try to find new technological solutions for their production processes with ex-ante not
anticipated consequences; on the other hand, new unforeseen and unexpected discoveries
external to a firm may change the current situation. Thus, firms’ decisions including their
behaviour to exchange know-how cannot be described in a neoclassical optimization context
but are to be seen as bounded rational.
-Technological opportunities
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The development space within which firms learn and which firms attempt to explore consists
of a broad set of technological opportunities providing potentials for progress. Here several
regularities can be observed. First, the developmental potential of a specific technology is
increasingly exhausted with progress on the respective technological trajectory. So-called
intensive technological opportunities (Coombs (1988)) are becoming depleted step by step.
By this technological as well as scientific boundaries come into effect more and more making
further improvements increasingly difficult and sometimes even impossible to achieve.
Second, besides intensive opportunities characterizing a specific technology there are also
extensive technological opportunities which arise out of cross-fertilization among different
technologies (Mokyr (1990)). Here, new technical solutions are often actively initiated by
firms which then generate new opportunities by the combination of already existing
technologies. Sometimes the amalgamation of different - ex-ante considered as unrelated -
technologies leads to totally new technological fields; mechatronic or bionic are points in
case. These structural tensions (Dahmén (1989)) between complementary technologies are an
important prerequisite providing firms with an incentive to behave cooperatively, i.e.
exchange their knowledge in order to get access to external knowledge sources.
Such technological interdependencies and their combining effect arise from different sources:
Besides new ideas and findings in academia the manifold effects between up- and downstream
productions among firms within and between industries are potential sources of such cross-
fertilization. These mutual influences come into effect mainly by technological spillovers.
-Technological spillovers and appropriability
Spillover effects arise whenever new technological know-how is not a purely private good and
thus not entirely appropriable by the innovating firm.1 Imperfect appropriability conditions are
responsible for inventors realistically anticipating that they will receive less than the
maximum benefits arising out of an innovation. However, for two reasons modern innovation
theory states that knowledge is only a latent public good. On the one hand, the capabilities of
firms are not perfect so that they cannot simply draw back on any kind of often firm-specific
external knowledge. On the other hand, technological knowledge has a local character caused
by the technological specificities of different technological approaches. In mainstream
                                                
1  See e.g. Winter, S. G. (1989).
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economics - modelling homogeneous agents and single innovation processes - the supposed
public good character of new know-how is the main reason for an incentive to behave
defectively and the firms’ endeavours to keep their new knowledge secret. New innovation
theory does not deny this but also emphasizes the idea-creating features of knowledge
spillovers in the context of heterogeneous agents and different complementary and
substitutive innovation activities.
Therefore, it is necessary to know whether these spillovers are only caused by imperfect
appropriability conditions or whether they are actively initiated by firms. In other words, are
they unplanned spillovers (Chesnais (1996)) going hand in hand with defective effects or
purposefully initiated organizational devices? In the following, it will be argued that a
prominent source of these spillovers are informal networks where firms voluntarily exchange
new know-how in order to explore new extensive technological opportunities.
-Informal networks
The necessity to draw back on external knowledge sources has stimulated new mechanisms of
collective action. Besides formal forms, such as R&D joint-ventures or the establishing of
technological standards, they include more informal practices, such as reverse engineering,
and information exchange networks among engineers and scientists2. Reverse engineering
means the involuntary leakage of new technical information, whereas informal
communication in networks can be understood as a voluntary information exchange. Von
Hippel (1989) introduced the concept of informal know-how trading and found empirical
evidence for this in several industries. Informal know-how trading is the voluntary exchange
of technical information and could be interpreted as a process of actively initiating
technological spillovers. Nelson (1988, p. 318) states in this respect: ″However, in some cases
firms take positive actions to make their proprietary knowledge available to others“. These
new inter-firm-learning activities signal the changing nature of the technological progress and
the declined ability of single actors to struggle alone with complexity.
What are the reasons for these knowledge-networks? Why do firms show cooperative
attitudes? Informal networking can lead to positive sum games in the innovation activities of
                                                
2  See Foray (1995).
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firms participating in the respective networks3. Besides an improved capability to meet the
requirements for adaptations due to evolving technologies and improving the efficiency in
times of change, the firms expect synergistic benefits. The amalgamation of different
knowledge fields often results in the creation of something totally new, helping all involved
actors to overcome technological constraints. To realize these synergistic benefits it is not
sufficient to only know what the others are doing, but the firms even need to know how the
respective technologies function and work together. And, for this inter-firm learning of often
long-ranged cumulative, tacit and specialized know-how, a stable and long lasting cooperative
environment is necessary4. Clark and Juma (1987, p.85) introduced the notion of ev lutionary
articulation characterized with an essentially resonating feature: ″In order to achieve the
status of useful knowledge it [ he information flow] needs to undergo a process of
evolutionary articulation between supplier and recipient.″ In a complex innovation process,
networks are in a way a new institutionalized type of industrial organization5, capable of
dealing better with this learning under high know-how requirements. Informal networking is
an important mechanism for innovation diffusion and therefore an essential factor for enabling
technical progress6.
These learning possibilities are a strong motive to behave cooperatively, which trade-off the
opening up of extensive opportunities, and the acquisition of knowledge against potential
losses due to cheating and opportunism7. The increasing complexity of technological know-
how forces firms to seek access to external knowledge sources with the important
consequence that they also have to be such an external knowledge source in a broader context.
Through the knowledge exchange processes a stable cooperative environment can be created.
According to the respective share of cooperative attitudes, this increases the chance of a
realization of surplus.
-Informal networking and the industrial life cycle
                                                
3  Dodgson (1994), p. 286 speaks of  the improved ability to deal with complexity.
4  Kodama, F. (1992),″... technology fusion grows out of long term R&D-ties with a variety of companies across
many different industries.″
5 For Witt (1997) an institution develops with regularities in behaviour which are shown up regularly in similar
situations.
6 See Zuscovitch/Justman (1995).
7 See Mody (1993).
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In the literature the emergence of informal networks is often combined with technological
uncertainty.8 In a survey about reasons for innovation networks between firms, Dodgson
(1993, p. 44) states „... within this technological perspective, a key feature stimulating
collaboration is uncertainty about technological development and diffusion. Since
Schumpeter, many analyses of technical change have emphasized the discontinuous nature of
innovation, and the problem this poses for firms.“ E.g. the paradigm/trajectory-framework9
directly associates the discontinuous nature of the innovation process with the role of
uncertainty. While during the early phases of the creation of a new paradigm one is confronted
with severe uncertainty, those contingencies decrease with further development and
exhaustion of the specific technological opportunities.10 Besides this, investigations of
industry life cycles (e.g. Klepper and Graddy (1990), Klepper (1997), Klepper and Simons
(1997) and Utterback (1987)) have shown that in the early phases of new industries, which are
mostly congruent to the emergence of a new technological paradigm, the market more or less
is divided into small- and medium-sized firms. However, these Schumpeterian creative
entrepreneurs (Schumpeter (1912)) are restricted in their possibilities to finance expensive
research projects. One possibility to surmount financial bottlenecks is the collective pushing
forward of technological progress and the exploration of new extensive opportunities via
knowledge exchange in informal networks.
However, due to success-breeds-success effects, the most successful firms will increasingly
grow while less successful firms are threatened by exit from the market. This leads to a
concentration process - only a few but large firms will finally rule the respective market.
„ Implicitly, this involves a process whereby success breeds success, so that successful firms
take over greater share of the market over time, leading to greater concentration.“ (Klepper,
(1997, p. 151)).
                                                
8 See Granstrand/Sjolander (1990) and Freeman (1991).
9 See Dosi (1988), p. 1134.
10 ″I suggest that, in general, innovative search is characterized with strong uncertainty. This applies, in primis
to those phases of technical change that could be called preparadigmatic: During these highly exploratory
periods one faces a double uncertainty regarding both the practical outcomes of the innovative search and also
the scientific and technological principles and the problem solving procedures on which technological advance
could be based. When a technological paradigm is established, it brings with it a reduction of uncertainty, in the
sense, that it focuses the directions of search and forms the grounds of formating technological and market
expectations more surely.″ Dosi (1988), p.1134.
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In the sense of Schumpeter (1943), these large enterprises are now less confronted with
financial constraints in pushing ahead their specific research projects. On the one hand, they
can more easily raise the necessary R&D budgets, on the other hand, at later stages of the
technological development, technological opportunities are almost depleted directing the
research endeavours more to incremental and less expensive technological improvements and
the exploitation of scale economies. Thus, their willingness to behave cooperatively and share
an informal network by generously making public new know-how is certainly decreasing.
3. Informal Networks in a Synergetic Framework
In the following we will introduce a theoretical approach to model the evolution of informal
networks which also allows for the consideration of the time patterns most likely to occur in
an industrial life cycle context. In contrast to neoclassical modelling our synergetic approach
avoids the restrictive assumptions of perfect information and rationality by focusing on the
routinized character of firm behaviour and the institutional character of innovation networks.
In particular this approach focuses on self-organizational features in the evolution of informal
networks by explicitly considering the effect of the macro-environment i.e. the institutional
character of an informal network.
First, the basic structure of the model and an analytical solution will be outlined before we
show some numerical simulations which become necessary when time-dependent transition
rates are included.
3.1 The Basic Structure of the Model
First we have to introduce a population of N irms which all are engaged in R&D. These firms
are deciding in every period whether to behave according to a cooperative attitude ‘c’ and
disclose - at least partly - their new knowledge, or behave non-cooperatively ‘nc’ b  avoiding
the leaking out of their new R&D results. The number of firms behaving cooperatively is N1,
non-cooperative firms are counted by N2 respectively, accordingly N=N1+N2. Additionally, we
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Fig. 1 schematically shows the state-space: on the left side we find a totally non-cooperative
environment ~N =-N/2 where all firms apply a strategy of secrecy; accordingly, the right side
represents an informal network including all firms ~N =N/2. In-between states represent the
respective distributions of actors with cooperative and non-cooperative strategies. The applied
algorithm - the master-equation - describes the continuous development of this discrete state-
space 
~
N  by computing the probability P N t(
~
; )  to meet a certain state in the course of time.
Fig. 1: state-space
What are the determinants of firm behaviour? To answer this question we have to introduce
the individual transition rates, the core element of a master-equation. First, consider the
incentives to change behaviour of an original non-cooperative firm along the state-space. A
non-cooperative firm can join the informal network at any point in time (nc→c). The firm is
influenced in its decision by the prevailing macrostructure P N t(
~
; )  - the either cooperative or
non-cooperative environment. Concerning the latter, the firm feels only a low pressure to
change its strategy and behave cooperatively. The probability of finding complementary
know-how in a likewise small informal network is small. However, the possibility of cross-
fertilization effects grows with the size of the informal cooperation for two reasons: on the
one hand, with a growing number of cooperative firms the quantity of the spillover pool also
grows. On the other hand, at least in the short run, the quality of spillovers also increases with
increasing heterogeneity of the firms participating in the network. With growing quantity and
quality, the probability of combining seemingly inconsistent ideas increases. And the missing
~
N =-N/2 ~N =0                    ~N =N/2
N1=0; N2=N N1=N2=N/2 N1=N;
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know-how to detect the beneficial dynamic synergies is captured by this originally defective
firm entering the network.
To represent this formally we use a simple linear relationship
(2) i Nnc c→ = ⋅β
~
; β>0.
 The incentive to join the informal network inc→c increases with increasing network size. The
parameter β represents the intensity of R&D endeavours. A larger β value means a growing
intensity of technology. This could also be interpreted as β representing technological
uncertainty whereby we refer to the assumption - often found in the literature - that with
increasing R&D intensity technological uncertainty increases also.
We assume that the advantages of the cooperative strategy are the disadvantages of the non-
cooperative strategy and vice versa; therefore transition rates are symmetric. In an overall non-
cooperative environment the pressure to change the cooperative attitude (c→nc) and behave
defectively is likewise large. On the one hand, the potential disadvantages of falling behind by
disclosing one’s own knowledge, and the non-cooperative behaviour of others, has to be
considered. On the other hand, the probability of finding complementary know-how and
realizing the beneficial effects of the extensive opportunities is quite small in a more or less
defective environment. But the incentive to behave defectively ic→nc decreases in an
increasingly cooperative environment. To represent this, formally we get
(3) i Nc nc→ = − ⋅β
~
.
Finally, we have to consider the time-dependence of the willingness of firms to cooperate. It is
argued below that in early phases of the technological development firms are more likely
willing to exchange their know-how due to technological as well as financial constraints.
However, this cooperative attitude decreases on later stages of the technology life cycle when
the exploitation of scale economies and incremental innovations are in the centre of interest.
Formally, we consider this time-dependence of the willingness to cooperate by including a
time-preference function δ(t) in the transition rates. In the most simple case we suppose a
linear relationship of the preference function with respect to the industry life cycle:
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(4) δ δ δ( ) , ,t r t r= − ⋅ >0 0 0,
where δ0 represents the preference for cooperation at the beginning and r represents the rate of
reduction in the course of time.
Drawing back on the elements above we get the following transition rates (5) describing the
probability to switch to the cooperative strategy if initially non-cooperative and (6) vice versa:
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where α is a scaling parameter. This exponential formulation usually found in the literature
for transition rates has a twofold effect: First it normalizes the respective values to the positive
area, as is necessary because of representing transition probabilities. This exponential
formulation further ensures the effect of short-term self-enhancing and wide range
attenuation.11 At first, the growing network size supports the beneficial effects of the
cooperative environment. But in the long run there are two reasons for an attenuation of this
effect. On the one hand, there is a growing probability that the firms in the network have
already realized the opportunities another firm outside the network can offer. On the other
hand, the heterogeneity of firms in the network decreases because they will become
technologically closer by sharing their know-how.12 However, heterogeneity is a necessary
precondition for a high information content of spillovers.
With these transition rates we can now formulate the master equation (7) describing the
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11 See Eger and Weise (1995) and Gierer (1981).
12  Dodgson (1996), p. 67: „If firms in a network share knowledge over a longer period, then they will
increasingly come to resemble one another with detrimental consequences for novelty and innovation.“
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where we used so-called total transition probabilities qnc→c and qc→nc describing the aggregate
behaviour
(8) q N N p N
N
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The first two terms on the r.h.s. of the master-equation (7) indicate the probability flows from
neighbour states into the state 
~
N , whereas the other two terms describe the flows which leave
the respective state. The master equation can therefore be interpreted as a kind of profit and
loss account of a single state.
3.2  The Analytical Treatment of the System
Time-dependent transition rates do not allow for an analytical solvability of our system.
Therefore, we first ignore this time dependency by neglecting (4) and show some useful
analytical features of our master-equation describing the evolution of informal networks.
Following Weidlich and Haag (1983) we can transform our discrete state space to a
continuous one by introducing the variable x:
(10) x=2(n1-0.5)=-2(n2-0.5), x∈[-1; 1]
which describes the whole population as relative shares of cooperative (n1=N1/N) and non-
cooperative (n2=N2/N) firms. For time-independent total transition rates we get:
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1
2 2
α β  and
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α β  where ~β β= ⋅ N
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and K(x) is the so called rift-coefficient13, which strikes the balance between both possible
directions of change:
(13) K x q x q xnc c c nc( )
~ ( ) ~ ( )= −→ → .
By integrating this drift-coefficient over the state space we get the potential function V(x)
(14)
V x K x dx
x x x dx
x x x const
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This potential function can be used to derive an implicit picture of the development in the
course of time without explicitly considering time t.14 Resting points of a potential function
are the respective minima, which cannot be left without an exogenous impulse. They represent
so-called stationary solutions in which the development of the system’s macro-structure has
come to rest and only minor and balanced fluctuations on the micro-structure will occur. In
fig. 2 we see the potential function for different values of the technological intensity β.
fig. 2a) β=0.8 fig. 2b) β=1
                                                
13 Weidlich/Haag (1983), p. 23.
14  See Erdmann (1993), pp. 27-3.
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fig. 2c) β=1.25
The resting-point context is expressed by the black marble which come to a standstill in the
attraction of an equilibrium at the bottom of the potential function. In the case of low
technological intensity (β=0.8) shown in fig. 2a) we find a unequivocal solution where the
probability to find either a cooperative or a non-cooperative firm equals 0.5. So here, the firms
are divided into two same-sized groups, one acting cooperatively, the other defectively. In an
environment where technology is not of major importance, the effect of short-term self-
enhancing and wide range attenuation is responsible for the by and large neglecting of the
possibility of a larger informal network because of the likely technological resemblance
caused by an exchange of know-how.
In the second scenario we increase technology intensity (β=1.0). The black marble does not
stop here in an unequivocal minimum but rolls around in a quite flat valley of the potential
function. Responsible for this is a significant decrease of the effect of the wide range
attenuation. Higher technological intensity leads to slower depletion of the potentials of cross-
fertilization. Therefore, firms do not resemble each other in the same way as above, the
exploration of new extensive opportunities becomes more likely even at more advanced
phases of the technological trajectory. We find here a somewhat fuzzy solution including
higher probabilities for larger non-cooperative environments as well as larger informal
networks.
In the third scenario we increase technological intensity even further. With respect to the
previous scenarios we find a totally changed development. Here, two different possible
solutions can be clearly discriminated. The valley of the potential function into which the
black marble will fall cannot be predicted but depends on critical fluctuations during the phase
transition the system undergoes. There is a local minimum for a solution where defective
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behaviour dominates. Here, despite the requirements of collective invention no larger network
formation seems to be possible. But this minimum is not global; on the other, more
cooperative side of the graph a second local minimum can be found. This solution describes a
large informal network, where the respective cooperative firms at least partly share their
technological know-how and large technological spillovers are actively initiated. Here,
besides the short-term self-enhancing feature, a long-run positive impact additionally makes
the original solution unstable and leads to a new bimodal distribution of cooperative and non-
cooperative firms. The formation of informal networks with a firm strategy of actively
initiating spillovers is as probable as the formation of isolated firms with more traditional
defective attitudes towards the impact of technological spillovers.
4. Simulating the Evolution of Informal Networks
After these first analytical insights of the system we now include the time-dependence of the
willingness to cooperate (4) into the transition rates supposed to occur in an industry life cycle
context. In the case of time-dependent transition rates no longer any conclusion can be made
by drawing back on potential functions; for the analysis of the evolution of informal networks
numerical simulations of the respective system becomes unavoidable. Now, a stationary
solution expressed by the minimum(a) of the potential function no longer exists, any specific
developments taken place are continuously threatened by a changing environment maintaining
the system’s dynamics.
In a first simulation we again investigate a scenario with a low technology intensity (β=0.8).
Starting with an egalitarian distribution of cooperative and non-cooperative firms
P(N1=N2;0)=1 we get the development shown in figure 3a. Additionally, so-called density
plots (fig. 3b) are pictured which show the development of the peak of the probability





fig. 3a) Probability  distribution of scenario I (β=0.8, δ0=0.25, r=0.0005)
x
fig. 3b) Density plot of scenario I (β=0.8, δ0=0.25, r=0.0005)
Despite a low technological intensity, at the beginning of the industry life cycle we find a clear
bias in the direction of larger informal networks which can be entirely traced back to the
inclusion of the preference function. In the course of time the willingness to cooperate steadily
decreases, following the preference function which continuously shifts towards defective
behaviour. Accordingly, the probability of informal networks decreases in the course of the
industry-life-cycle, firms try to keep their new know-how secret which more and more
prevents larger spillover pools. In this scenario we do not find any unexpected consequences
due to the original basic willingness to cooperate. At the end of the outlined development the
preference for cooperation in the transition rates is so low that the probability to find firms
engaged in informal know-how-exchange is almost zero.
t
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Are there any changes to be expected if we switch to a scenario with a higher technological





fig. 4a) Probability distribution of scenario II (β=1.5, δ0=0.25, r=-0.0005)
x
fig. 4b) Density plot of scenario II (β=1.5, δ0=0.25, r=-0.0005)
Again we see a bias towards cooperative environments, now even more significant compared
to the development sketched above. The emergence of large informal networks is now much
faster and more distinctive. A higher technological intensity going hand in hand with a faster
pace of technical progress is responsible for informal networks to become self-
t
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organizationally a strong attractor over a longer period of time. The exploration of extensive
opportunities through the amalgamation of different technologies makes a cooperative
spillover-oriented R&D strategy attractive for several periods. Now, in scenario II, an informal
network is dominant even if the preference function in the individual transition rates would
already indicate defective behaviour on the firm’s micro-level. Informal networks on the
macro-level are a kind of an attraction field, which cannot be left without considerable efforts.
Not before the preference function increases even more, a sudden but abrupt wheeling around
towards the strategy of secrecy is to be observed. Figure 5 illustrates this abrupt change by




fig. 5: Phase portraits of selected periods
Despite the original preference for cooperation, we again find a phase transition in the
evolution of informal networks in this scenario. However, only after about two thirds of the
time horizon investigated, a small probability for non-cooperative environments begins to
increase, even if first on a likewise low level - the probability distribution becomes bimodal.
In the first instance this possibility of a non-cooperative solution is only a weak attractor
which does not gain importance and influence before the final periods. Here, the decline in the
individual preferences for cooperation reaches a critical threshold causing the probability of
an informal network to decrease sharply.
In the context of industry-life-cycles the causes of this threshold effect can be seen in the
shakeout of smaller cooperative firms at the final stage of the technological development.
Thus, at the end of our simulated development we can just assume a few larger, but non-
cooperative firms in that industry, now also characterized by a larger degree of concentration.
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5. Conclusions
In a technological development characterized as a ‘collective invention’, cooperative
environments can emerge via self-organization. The requirements of the modern innovation
process demand new forms of industrial organization and the phenomenon of informal know-
how exchange is probably a very promising one15. Our model is able to demonstrate the
possible evolution of an informal network, thereby not using traditional analytical tools with
the criticised restrictive assumption of perfect rationality. The synergy in the evolution of an
open system, where mutually reinforcing factors create dynamic effects under certain
circumstances makes both possibilities, a cooperative and a non-cooperative environment
probable. Which solution actually establishes cannot be predicted ex-ante and depends on
small perturbations in the course of time. This open feature in the development of informal
networks corresponds quite well to the indeterminacy, intrinsic to technological evolution.
However, the different solutions are dependent on the technological intensity. Especially in
environments where technological factors play an outstanding role, a positive probability for
the emergence and the absence of a network exists. These results correspond to observations
in reality. Although technology is very important in some industries like pharmaceuticals and
chemicals, these branches are quite self-sufficient with respect to R&D, and the establishment
of an informal network is less likely to occur. However, in other industries, such as
semiconductors and aerospace, which are also technologically intensive, the phenomenon of
informal networking can be observed more readily16.
Additionally, the results of our model can be interpreted in the light of emerging industries in
a life-cycle context. In early formative periods of new technological systems by definition
almost no dominant design and standards exist. These periods are characterized by high
technological uncertainty. Thus, until a dominant design emerges, there are advantageous
conditions for the establishment of large informal networks and cooperative environments. In
later periods when economies of scale and standardization become more and more important
cooperatitive attitudes diminish17. This indicates a cyclical feature of informal networking
with respect to the age of technological paradigms. Moreover, our results suggest that
                                                
15 Clark and Juma (1987, p. 170) state: ″Coping with non-linear situations requires effective information flows
and systemic organization in which networking plays a significant role.″
16  See Eliasson (1995).
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significant spillover pools can be found in industries characterized by a large technological
intensity in even more mature phases of the development: here informal networks become a
dominant attractor despite the intuitive expectation of a dominance of a strategy aiming at
keeping new know-how secret.
The last point worth mentioning concerns methodological issues. With the integration of time
patterns a first step is done to weaken the reproach often made to synergetics to model in fact
development processes, but thereby not allowing the individual transition rates to develop. Of
course, the time patterns integrated here, are of an exogenous nature, and an endogenous time
pattern is yet to be included. This will be on our future research agenda.
                                                                                                                                           
17  See Dodgson, M. (1993) and Freeman, C. (1991).
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